

HAUPTVORTRÄGE / MAIN LECTURES

Hauptvortrag	M	Main Lecture
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Montag, 14.09. Rathaus Obere Rathaushalle 19:00 – 20:00	Ansgar Beckermann Darwin – Was, wenn der Mensch auch nur ein Tier ist?	Monday, 14.09. Town Hall Upper Hall 19:00 – 20:00
Mittwoch, 16.09. Hörsaalgebäude, großer Hörsaal 15:30 – 16:30	Wolfgang Kühne Sense, Reference and Hybrid Thought-Expressions	Wednesday, 16.09. Grand Lecture Hall 15:30 – 16:30
Mittwoch, 16.09. Hörsaalgebäude, großer Hörsaal 20:00 – 21:30	Mark Sainsbury Rationality without Transparency	Wednesday, 16.09. Grand Lecture Hall 20:00 – 21:30
Donnerstag, 17.09. Hörsaalgebäude, großer Hörsaal 12:30 – 14:00	R. Jay Wallace Reasons, Values, and Agent-Relativity	Thursday, 17.09. Grand Lecture Hall 12:30 – 14:00

M Beckermann

Darwin – Was, wenn der Mensch auch nur ein Tier ist?

Ansgar Beckermann
Universität Bielefeld

Sigmund Freud hat von „Kränkungen ihrer naiven Eigenliebe“ gesprochen, die „die Menschheit im Laufe der Zeiten von der Wissenschaft [hat] erdulden müssen.“ Zu diesen Kränkungen zählt er Kopernikus' Theorie, dass die Erde nicht im Mittelpunkt der Welt steht, und Darwins Evolutionstheorie, die „das angebliche Schöpfungsvorrecht des Menschen zunichte machte [und] ihn auf die Abstammung aus dem Tierreich und die Unvertilgbarkeit seiner animalischen Natur verwies“. Während die vermeintliche Kränkung durch Kopernikus nicht allzu schwer wiegt, stellt Darwins Theorie in der Tat eine nicht zu unterschätzende Herausforderung an unser herkömmliches Selbstbild dar. Wenn wir uns nicht mehr als von Gott geschaffene Krone der Schöpfung, nicht mehr als sein Ebenbild begreifen können, was bleibt dann noch? Was ist mit der Menschenwürde? Was mit Freiheit und Verantwortung? Was mit Liebe, Dankbarkeit und Trauer? Sind all dies nur Illusionen? Oder bleiben diese Aspekte unseres Daseins auch dann real, wenn wir uns als durch und durch natürliche Wesen begreifen?

M Künne

Sense, Reference and Hybrid Thought-Expressions

Wolfgang Künne
Universität Hamburg

In his recently published Stockholm lecture on „Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference“ Saul Kripke remarks: „Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects...“ On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubborn. Thus I shall insist on the need for distinguishing Fregean (noematic) sense from linguistic (lexicogrammatical) meaning, I shall resist Kripke's function-theoretic account of hybrid thought-expressions, and I shall deplore his transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressell. On the whole, I hope to convince you that there are good reasons both for my yieldingness and for my obstinacy.

Sainsbury M

Rationality without Transparency

Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Benson Mates (1950) offered an argument whose conclusion appears to be that, if there are any pairs of synonymous expressions, replacing one by a synonym may turn a truth into a falsehood. In explaining how this can be so, I suggest we must appeal to the fact that someone may understand both of two synonymous expressions without being able to know a priori that they are synonymous. This is what has been called failure of transparency.

It has been argued (for example by Boghossian 1994) that to allow the possibility of this kind of failure is to subvert our normal conception of rationality. I argue that this is not so. Good reasoning requires being good at recognizing formal relationships, and the relation of synonymy is not formal. Good reasoning also requires being good at noticing relations of synonymy, but is consistent with some failures.

I argue, contrary to Boghossian, Kripke (1979), and others, that in certain unusual circumstances (e.g. the Paderewski kind) it can be more rational for a subject to believe things that are contradictory than not to do so. This (I suggest) accords with our ordinary conception of rationality, and has only one potentially subversive effect: some (but not all) arguments for Fregean views are shown to be inadequate.

Wallace M

Reasons, Values, and Agent-Relativity

R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley

According to T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason-giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons and values. I start by acknowledging the role that substantive values play in specifications of our reasons, noting that this poses an apparent challenge to the buck-passing account. The challenge can be met, however, if we adopt a deliberative understanding of substantive value, an interpretation that I proceed to develop and defend. In conclusion I consider recent attempts to capture the agent-relativity of reasons within a teleological framework for thinking about the rela-

tion between reasons and values. I argue that these approaches rest on a deliberative understanding of value; the teleological framework thus turns out to illustrate the basic insight of the buck-passing approach, rather than offering an alternative to it.